The Operating System Kernel as a Secure Programmable Machine

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Abstract

To provide modularity and performance, operating system kernels should have only minimal embedded functionality. Today’s operating systems are large, inefficient and, most importantly, inflexible. In our view, most operating system performance and flexibility problems can be eliminated simply by pushing the operating system interface lower. Our goal is to put abstractions traditionally implemented by the kernel out into user-space, where user-level libraries and servers abstract the exposed hardware resources. To achieve this goal, we have defined a new operating system structure, exokernel, that safely exports the resources defined by the underlying hardware. To enable applications to benefit from full hardware functionality and performance, they are allowed to download additions to the supervisor-mode execution environment. To guarantee that these extensions are safe, techniques such as code inspection, inlined cross-domain procedure calls, and secure languages are used. To test and evaluate exokernels and their customization techniques a prototype exokernel, Aegis, is being developed.

1 Introduction

Traditionally, operating systems have implemented system objects (such as processes, address spaces, exception handling), forcing applications to make do with what is provided. Frequently these abstractions are inadequate, their implementation slow, or both [4, 5, 14, 15, 22, 29, 31]. We believe that these problems can be solved by simply lowering the interface to the hardware that is enforced by the kernel: namely, by exporting physical resources to applications directly, management and abstraction of these resources can be specialized for simplicity, efficiency, and appropriateness. Exposing the raw hardware aids kernel extensibility in a direct manner: the easiest kernel primitive to extend is the one that is not there. The low-level interface exported by the exokernel opens the possibility of user-level implementations of basic system objects. Furthermore, these implementations can coexist on the same system allowing them to be tuned to a specific application domain and, potentially, realized at a level of efficiency unmatched by any current system. More importantly, the exokernel allows applications to craft their own abstractions (without emulation on high-level OS primitives) in ways that are fundamentally not possible in any other operating system.

Unlike our approach, a traditional monolithic operating system normally provides a single fixed policy for resource management. However, no single policy is best for all applications. For example, file system and relational database applications often have different storage access patterns and therefore benefit from different buffer and disk management policies. Similar policy conflicts arise in almost every area of resource management (for example, in virtual memory management [15]). Microkernels have pushed some policy decisions out of the kernel into user-level servers. However, these policies cannot, generally, be altered or replaced by non-privileged applications. Additionally, in these microkernels the supervisor mode still defines a high-level, fixed interface among the kernel, user-level services, and applications. Therefore, applications suffer from a large number of protection domain crossings. These crossings are typically expensive, as they in-
volve entering supervisor mode and changing address spaces [3, 7, 25].

The disadvantages of fixed operating system policies are made worse by the growing diversity in hardware platforms and rapid advances of technology. For example, in a mobile computer it is of crucial importance to save power by carefully managing the spin-down policy of the disk. As an example of rapid advances in technology, new architectures support protected user-level communication that requires little involvement of the operating system [6, 19]. By fixing policies operating system software prevents applications from evolving with the hardware.

By moving management of resources out of the operating system kernel, an exokernel allows aggressive customization. We see three reasons for customization:

- Tailor policies to given hardware configurations, allowing applications to advance with the hardware.
- Tailor policies to given applications. For example, the interaction of application and the virtual memory system is crucial to the performance of applications. Changes to VM policies can enable distributed shared memory systems and garbage collectors to run an order of magnitude faster.
- Improve performance by reducing the overhead of interrupts, TLB faults, traps and context switches, which are some of the primary sources of overhead in today's operating systems. Customization allows compile-time and run-time specialization.

To minimize the performance impact of crossing the kernel boundary, the exokernel allows applications to run user code safely in the kernel. In this paper we discuss three techniques to make the exokernel design safe and efficient: (1) code inspection, (2) inlined cross-domain calls, and (3) type-safe languages. We are prototyping the new design and implementation techniques in Aegis, an experimental exokernel.

The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a design sketch of a prototype exokernel, Aegis; Section 3 discusses our proposal for a secure programmable machine and the implementation techniques that permit safe customization across the supervisor mode barrier. In Section 4, we briefly discuss related work and in Section 5 we conclude.

2 An Exokernel Structure

We are building the Aegis kernel to test the feasibility of an exokernel that provides minimal resource allocation, arbitration services, and a programmable interface. In designing the Aegis exokernel, we intend to strictly limit the functionality that is embedded and non-customizable. Many of the primitives supplied by other “minimalistic” kernels are viewed as applications by the exokernel. For example, we do not expect the kernel to include page-table management, a file-system, inter-process communication, or processes management. We expect the Aegis system to enable unprecedented experimentation with techniques for safe customization of application operating environments.

The exokernel’s sole function is to allocate, deallocate, and multiplex physical resources in a secure way. The resources exported by the exokernel include physical memory (divided into pages), the CPU (divided into time-slices), the TLB, context-identifiers, and disk memory (divided into blocks).

Access to physical resources is controlled through 64-bit capabilities that rely on “security through obscurity” [23]. The operational view of access control is that each resource (e.g., time-slices, pages) is associated with a capability. Every point the resource could be used is protected by a guard. When an application wishes to use a resource it presents the capability to the guard. The guard checks the access rights given by the capability.

The exokernel performs two non-physical functions: exception forwarding and upcalls. The exokernel hands exceptions directly to applications, enabling efficient user-level exception handling. Upcalls implement synchronous cross-domain transfer of control. Operationally, an upcall transfers the program counter in one domain to an agreed upon value in another, and installs the called domain’s exception context. This mechanism is lightweight (our unoptimized implementation takes 20 instructions on a MIPS R3000) and lets applications build their own IPC semantics (i.e., a client can trust a server to save and restore registers).

To allow applications to fully exploit the physical hardware, the exokernel provides facilities to download code behind the supervisor barrier. For example, this code can access unmapped physical memory, which can be important for handling TLB-miss exceptions. Additionally, by allowing user code and state to reside behind the supervisor barrier, the frequency of user/supervisor kernel crossings can be reduced. The techniques we use for this are described in Section 3.

The exokernel's low-level interface is defined by

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1 Since we intend for the exokernel to scale across different trust models, the capability size can be modified. For instance, in an embedded system that has cooperating processes, capabilities may simply be the name of the object.
the raw hardware: physical memory pages, DMA channels, I/O devices, translation look-aside buffer, processors, addressing context identifiers, and interrupt/trap events. This “abstraction free” interface allows flexible user-level implementations of traditionally rigidly defined OS services. For instance, since the exokernel does not enforce a particular page-table structure, applications can aggressively specialize them. Since the address space of a “protected object” may contain just a few pages, it can be mapped using a small linear page-table, while a single 64-bit address-space subsystem may use inverted pagetables. As another example, the exokernel allows applications to directly manipulate context-identifiers, enabling efficient protection domain switching, an action important to many applications [32].

3 A Secure Programmable Machine

We expect the operating system kernel to provide a programmable machine that permits applications to safely and efficiently manage system resources. The secure machine executes in supervisor mode because it uses privileged instructions. Our design protects the secure machine against unsafe application code using traditional methods: unsafe application code executes only in separate protection domains.

In addition, to permit efficient management of system resources, our design permits controlled execution of application code in supervisor mode. This makes the secure machine programmable and enables safe, efficient customization of the operating system. However, only safe application code may be executed in supervisor mode. We are examining several implementation techniques that permit safe customization across the supervisor mode barrier. These techniques ensure that application code will not access privileged instructions or protected data in uncontrolled ways:

1. **Code Inspection.** Code introduced into the secure programmable machine must be free of privileged instructions. As shown by Deutsch [11], machine code can be inspected to guard against wild loads, stores, and jumps. Execution time can also be controlled by bounding loop iteration counts. With sufficiently stringent restrictions on the application code, it can be safely executed in supervisor mode, and primitives of the secure machine that use privileged instructions can be inlined into the inspected code.

2. **Inlined cross-domain calls.** Code inspection that prohibits indirect loads and stores will be too restrictive for many application purposes. Wahbe [32] shows that sandboxing can be used to restrict the domain of indirect memory operations, but with an overhead of several instructions per guarded operation. The motivation of sandboxing is to simulate address-space protection domains when cross-domain calls are expensive. However, if the application code is executed in supervisor mode, then switching address spaces may require only a few privileged instructions (e.g., to change the processor context identifier). The application can execute in supervisor mode, but in a restricted addressing context. Protected data structures can be manipulated by calling machine primitives. If wild jumps are prevented, then cross-domain calls can be safely inlined, including the instructions that change the addressing context. An example of where this is used is in a TLB exception handler, which must be invoked with low-latency after a TLB miss.

3. **Type-safe language.** If applications need to customize the operating system kernel with operations that require frequent and intensive manipulation of shared protected data structures, then page-granularity protections may not suffice. Using a type-safe language and a trusted compiler might enable closer integration of application and kernel code, while simultaneously increasing portability. An example of this is our packet-filter engine, which uses dynamic code generation [12] to directly compile packet-filter predicates specified in a declarative, type-safe language.

We expect each of these techniques to be useful for some kinds of exokernel extensions, depending on the tradeoffs involved.

4 Related Work

Many early operating systems papers discussed the need for extensible kernels [34, 17, 21, 33], Lampson’s description of the CAL-TSS [20] and Brinch Hansen’s microkernel paper [13] are two classic rationales. Hydra was the most ambitious system to have the separation of kernel policy and mechanism as one of its central tenets [34]. Modern revisitations of microkernels have also argued for kernel extensibility [16, 26, 1, 28, 30, 10]. Anderson [2] and Kiczales et al. [18] also recently argued for minimalism and customization. Two important differences between our work and previous approaches are that: (1) the
fixed kernel interface in these systems is a high-level
one (e.g., page-tables are implemented by the kernel)
and (2) customization is expensive since it is usually
accomplished through the addition of servers that in-
teract with the kernel via IPC.

The interface provided by the VM/370 operating
system [9] is very similar to what would be provided
by an ideal exokernel, namely the raw hardware.
However, the important difference is that VM/370
provides this interface by virtualizing the entire base-
machine. Since this machine can be quite complicated
and expensive to emulate faithfully, virtualization can
have a high cost in both kernel complexity and effi-
ciency. In contrast, the exokernel exports hardware
resources rather than emulating them, allowing an
efficient and fast implementation.

Synthesis is an innovative operating system that
has inspired some of our work [22]; for example, the
use of runtime code generation. The Aegis system,
however, uses a portable runtime code generation
system [12], while the synthesis kernel is written in
assembly, and uses ad-hoc runtime code generation
macros to specialize system calls. Furthermore, the
Aegis system will use runtime code generation to
efficiently execute application kernel extensions.

Concurrently with our work the SPIN [5] and
Cache Kernel [8] projects are also investigating adap-
table kernels that allow applications to make policy
decisions efficiently.

The SPIN system encapsulates policies in spindles
that can be dynamically loaded into the kernel. To
ensure safety, spindles will be written in a point-
secure language and will be translated by a trusted
compiler. In contrast, we anticipate using a variety of
customization techniques that permit safe execution
of small pieces of application code within the exoker-
nel, some of which will allow the kernel interface to
be extended using existing application code. In addi-
tion, the exokernel aggressively moves code out of
the operating system kernel into user-space; its kernel
interface provides a much low-level interface than mi-
rokernels do. The SPIN project, on the other hand,
concentrates more on moving user code into a micro-
kernel.

The Cache Kernel shares our belief that a low-level
interface is the panacea that can cure current oper-
ing system troubles. The main difference between
the two projects is in how low the operating system
interface is pushed. The Cache Kernel designers still
see themselves in the business of abstracting physical
resources (i.e., hiding information, disallowing fine-
grain user-management) rather than exposing them
(i.e., removing as much abstraction/virtualization as
possible). For example, the Cache Kernel provides
address spaces, threads, and application kernels as
dependent abstractions. In contrast, the exoker-
nel exposes the machine primitives necessary to con-
struct these abstractions to applications; direct ma-
nipulation of physical resources allows applications
to implement services that were formerly enforced by
the operating system (e.g., page-table management),
with a corresponding improvement in flexibility and
performance. Additionally, the Cache Kernel has an
alarmist view about downloading application code
into the kernel [8]; this restricts the efficiency and
flexibility of their approach.

Techniques for certifying the safety of code in-
clude inspection and sandboxing. Deutsch showed
how to safely introduce user-written instrumentation
code into a running kernel by bounding loads, stores,
jumps and runtime [11]. Making existing binaries safe
has been done by Wahlbe [32]. Although this tech-
nique will be useful for controlling entry points, we
expect that loads and stores can be constrained more
efficiently by changing the address context quickly
within supervisor mode.

The use of a typesafe language to allow user ap-
plications to augment the operating system has been
explored in a personal workstation environment [27].
Myers argued for using a type safe language to load
application code into the object manager in a persist-
ent object system [24].

5 Conclusions

Operating systems must shed the burden of their tra-
ditional policy-laden services. We suggest exokernels
as an new minimal operating system design. The key
exokernel idea is to obtain flexibility through a low-
level kernel interface; i.e., the easiest kernel primitive
to extend is the one that is not there. To minimize the
overhead of protection domain crossings we proposed
three customization techniques.

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